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Questions and Open Discussion 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶1 We are going to have now a half hour for discussion.  I would like to begin with 
one cheap shot to Joshua.  I would very much like to see your predictions of the growth 
of the economic, military and technological prowess of China during the twenty-first 
century.  If you project that they will not catch up with us, then I would agree with you 
that this is not the time of maximum American power.  You will have a chance to reply in 
due course. 
¶2 Lord Hannay, would you like to respond to some of the remarks made about your 
report? 
SIR DAVID HANNAY: 
¶3 Thank you.  Very briefly because a lot of very valid points were made, and I 
certainly did not intend to pick them all up.  Sometimes I felt myself back in the Panel 
meetings, hearing the discussions that went on there on various points.  That I thought 
was interesting, because it validated the view that you had sixteen individuals from the 
four corners of the earth who were not chosen by governments – they were chosen by the 
Secretary-General – but they did reflect a lot of thinking from different parts of the globe 
and those different strands of thought were demonstrated in the two really excellent 
panels this morning. 
¶4 Just one or two points. 
¶5 On enlargement of the Security Council, it was, I am afraid, a lose-lose situation.  
There was never going to be one single Panel recommendation on that which would not 
have raised controversy. 
¶6 If we had said, “No recommendation, just get on with it, no formulas,” which I 
have to confess to you was my first preference personally, we would have been criticized 
for cowardice and ducking an important issue.  If we had produced a single proposal, we 
would have been criticized for that.  So we produced two formulas, and we are being 
criticized for that. 
¶7 There was no-win situation there.  I think myself that we came out with the least 
bad of the options, but that is not saying a lot because it is a subject which tends to drive 
everyone fairly mad when they get into it, depending on whether their sincere belief is in 
their own right to become a permanent member, or in their equally sincere belief that no 
one else should become one. 
¶8 On the Commission on Human Rights, I knew we were going to have trouble about 
this because, of course, the proposal that the commission should be made universal is, I 
readily accept, counterintuitive.  And all of you who have been commenting have tended 
to head off in the opposite direction, saying, “This is a very terrible thing that you have 
proposed because you are letting all these serial offenders into the Commission on 
Human Rights.” 
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¶9 Well, I would say to you two things.  First, they are already there anyway, and 
there is not the slightest chance of getting them out completely.  We looked at all the 
possibilities for applying criteria to the membership of the Commission on Human 
Rights, and we were perfectly clear in our minds that they would not work.  The risk was 
that you would just waste even more time than you do now in diplomatic maneuvering.  
The proposal for universality on the Commission of Human Rights has two advantages. 
¶10 One, it has the support of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 
Arbour, who knows a thing or two about these things and who is quite clear in her mind 
that this would be a step forward.  Second, it does foreshadow the day in which the 
Commission on Human Rights would become a full institution under the Charter equal to 
the General Assembly and to ECOSOC. 
¶11 But, what you all missed as you dashed off over the horizon saying how terrible it 
was to have universal membership is there are some other proposals which are designed 
to strengthen the commission.  The most important is the establishment of a pane l of 
about fifteen human rights experts, who would be chosen by the Commission, but on the 
recommendation of the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the Secretary-General. 
¶12 Well, if that limiting condition does not get fifteen people who are genuinely 
committed to human rights, I would be very surprised.  In my own experience in 
European institutions, you find that if you have a body like this which is preparing the 
meetings, it becomes much more difficult to move away into the area of diplomatic 
maneuver which is what the Commission on Human Rights has become.  Now, the proof 
of that will be if this is set up. 
¶13 I would argue that you should look very carefully before saying universal 
membership is a bad thing.  Do not forget also that you may get the worst of the bad 
already in a fifty-three-member commission, but there are an awful lot of silent best of 
the good who never come there at all.  They will be there if there is universal 
membership. 
¶14 Now, on weapons of mass destruction and not having taken any steps to say what 
happens there, it has all been done.  The Security Council Summit of 1992 was quite 
clear.  Proliferation of those weapons is a threat to peace and security.  That means the 
whole Chapter VII is engaged on that issue.  It is up to the Security Council to decide 
what action is to be taken. 
¶15 If there is a breach of the treaty or of safeguard arrangements, the IAEA is obliged 
to come to the Security Council and you do not need to write anything more down, you 
just need to do something about it. 
¶16 Another familiar problem.  There has been a lot of criticism from the third world 
about the lack of substantive content to what we proposed on development and on 
economic and social problems.  We were again in a no-win situation.  If we had come up 
with a very elaborate set of proposals on this, knowing that Jeffrey Sachs was about to 
produce his thousand-page paper,1 knowing that Kofi Annan wanted to have the ability to 
move from the Jeffrey Sachs paper to a set of proposals, we would have created massive 
confusion.  So, we had to content ourselves with some relatively modest proposals which, 
frankly, should not be seen as the center of the Panel’s report. 
 
1 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT , INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT : A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005), available at 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm. 
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¶17 But that does not mean that we do not believe that the economic and social aspects 
of decision-making in 2005 are every bit as important as the peace and security ones.  
You can just imagine the confusion we would have created if we had done a full scale 
number on AIDS, poverty elimination, or what have you. 
¶18 The final point I would like to make is that I am delighted to hear that somebody 
has discovered Article 47 of the UN Charter setting up the Military Staff Committee.  
You would be hard-pressed to find the military staff itself.  The Committee meets for all 
of three minutes once a month when its members get together, agree that they have no 
items on the agenda, and resume their meeting a month later.  It has been doing that for 
sixty years. 
¶19 It is, if you look at it, the most extraordinary provision in the UN Charter, because 
it envisions all the military action in the world being decided by the joint chiefs of staff of 
the five permanent members – nobody else gets invited. 
¶20 Now, I defy anyone to say that this is a provision that needs to be saved.  The only 
supporter of it – and that Joshua may be interested to know – the only supporter of it, was 
the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union’s last representative on Earth finally agreed that it 
was not a very useful provision of the Charter and it could go.  There we are. 
¶21 It is probably time to go, wave it good-bye.  It has never done anything useful; it 
never would do anything useful.  We did, however, propose something else, which was 
that the Secretary-General’s Military Adviser should make himself available on demand 
to the Security Council to give military advice, because many of the delegations on the 
Security Council do not have access to military advice.  So, we did a little thing in return 
for the proposed deletion; but it was a little thing on top of a nothing. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶22 Thank you very much, Lord Hannay.  With that the floor is open. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶23 I was impressed about five years ago by the speech that Richard Holbrooke gave to 
the UN in which he was very opposed to a lot of things the UN is doing.  I think partly to 
put it in terms of what you were talking about, the social contract idea, that that is just 
bad no matter what, I am wondering whether this report addresses any of those concerns.  
I think they are shared by a lot of the American public. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶24 Thank you very much. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶25 Thank you.  Adam Schefler.  Briefly, does the report deal with or would you like to 
comment on the role of other prominent US-based institutions such as the World Health 
Organization and the International Labor Organization, those two in particular.  I am 
extremely interested in how they are going to enact or have already been enacting some 
of this enormous development that was spoken of. 






¶27 I am Trevor Ulbrick, Editor- in-Chief of the Journal for International Human Rights 
here.  I thank you all for coming. 
¶28 Lord Hannay, you mentioned that the High-Level Panel almost immediately 
dismissed the idea of a rapid reaction force and I am wondering why, because in my mind 
this presents two problems. 
¶29 First, only the United States really has the capability to project military power 
globally so it seems to put all the impetus on to the US military.  Second, the fact that the 
rapid reaction force is not in place makes the threat of military force far less credible: we 
know how long it took for the UN to get peacekeeping troops together for Sudan. 




¶32 Picking up on the mention of the two-tiered system in the world and the fact that 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes up for review in May of this year, any 
comments on the prospects for survival or not of the two-tiered system within the NPT? 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶33 Thank you. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶34 You were talking about the American power.  I do not know what implications this 
had but I am reading from the Financial Times, which is referring to the National 
Intelligence Council’s report that had just come out on mapping the global future. 
¶35 This is what it says: “The emergence of China and India, and possibly Brazil and 
Indonesia, as great powers will challenge the very concept of ‘the west’ as a coherent 
entity.”2 
¶36 So, they are talking about – this is their report.  They are talking about an 
emergence.  And just one other comment. 
¶37 They also say in their 2020 report – and I do not know what implication this has – 
that average incomes will rise by fifty percent and the economy will be eighty percent 
bigger in 2020, and all of this will take place primarily in the poorer regions.  So, they are 
 
2 Philip Stephens, An American Map of the Future Bush Cannot Ignore, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at 
17. 
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saying that the poorer regions will see fast economic growth and they are also identifying 
the powers that are on the verge of really becoming a real reality in 2020.  I do not know 
if that is the implication. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶38 Thank you for your question. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶39 The recommendations seem to parallel the Leach Commission of some fifteen 
years ago.3  I wondered how the emergence of a majority of democratic states within the 
UN system might alter the kind of proposals that might be made in all of these areas. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶40 Thank you. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶41 Yes.  I guess this question is geared more towards Sir David. 
¶42 If you look at some of the, I think, really useful nuts-and-bolts proposals in the 
report, whether it is beefing up field-oriented affairs or shifting more imagination ability 
to the Secretary-General and creating sort of an intelligence capacity of the Secretariat, 
what all those have in common is that they are really shifting a lot of influence away 
from the member states.  I guess we have one of the ambassadors still up there, but as the 
discussions have been proceeding, there seems to have been a lot of resistance to a lot of 
those proposals that are contained in your report. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶43 Let’s take one last question here. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶44 The report alludes to two ongoing lengthy conflicts that the UN has failed to 
resolve over many decades. 
¶45 One of them is: Is there a Palestine?  President Bush recently stated his renewed 
hope that there might be a resolution of this conflict before the end of his current 
Administration in the year 2008.  I was just wondering if any of you would like to 
comment both on the length of that, the duration of that conflict, and on whether or not 
you think the year 2008 corresponds to the report’s use of the term “urgent.” 
 
3 See, e.g., Paul Lewis, US Panel Splits on Ways to Improve the UN , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at 
A13. 




¶46 All right.  I suggest that we now go in reverse order from before. 
JOSHUA MURAVCHIK: 
¶47 Well, a few quick points. 
¶48 In terms of the question asked about would the emergence of a democratic majority 
within the UN change things, the reality is there is a democratic majority now and, to this 
point, not much has changed.  It is a disappointing reality. 
¶49 According to the current count by Freedom House, there are 117 of the 
governments of the world.  That would make 116 of the members of the UN, because I 
did not include Taiwan, who are currently governed democratically and yet there has 
been little change. 
¶50 Lee has been very active together with Freedom House in pushing for a democratic 
caucus in the UN and it would undoubtedly be a salutary step if you could get it.  But, 
until this point, the large number of these democracies has been wedded to their 
membership in the nonaligned movement, and there has been all too little common action 
by the democracies in the UN. 
¶51 In terms of the projections of power of the National Intelligence Council, these are 
the same people who have told you that weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a slam 
dunk.  Their ability to say what the world is going to look like fifteen years from now, I 
would say, is more or less zero.  They are the same as if you went into any third grade 
class and asked the same question – these projections are notoriously empty. 
¶52 What is true is that the underdeveloped world is now on a path of much more rapid 
economic growth, and it is a great blessing.  It comes in large part as a result of having 
gotten out from under the advice of the United Nations, which for the first generation of 
independence of these countries advised them under the aegis of what was called 
dependency theory that they needed to have state-controlled economies in order to 
develop.  Many of them took this advice, and there was widespread stagnation in the poor 
world countries.  Eventually, everyone in the field of development of economics learned 
that this was exactly the wrong way to go from the example of the so-called four tigers of 
East Asia.4 
¶53 Finally, to Sir David, I am sorry I was inarticulate.  My point about Article 47 was 
not that I cherish the Military Staff Committee or hold a brief for the utility of its 
operations but rather that the emptiness of the Military Staff Committee is itself a 
function and a symbol of the emptiness of the entire structure of collective security that is 
set forth.  It is not because of some idea that only these particular generals should offer 
military advice, but it is because states have persistently proven unwilling to absorb into 
themselves the risks involved in going to war for collective security.  That, in fact, Kofi 
Annan himself acknowledged most pointedly when he said, “We cannot do peacekeeping 
where there is no peace to keep.” 
 
4 The four tigers of East Asia refers to Hong Kong (a Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China), Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.  See, e.g., Omar Saleem, The Spratly Islands 
Dispute: China Defines the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 527, 535 n.35 (2000); Howard 
Shapiro, CLE Conference The Tides of Trade: The Four Tigers, 2 INT’L LEGAL PERSP . 87, 87 (1990). 
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¶54 That is, the mission of the UN has been defined down from collective security in 
which the peace would be enforced by the UN – and that is what the Military Staff 
Committee was a symbol of – to one in which, when peace agreements have been made, 
the UN can provide a kind of militarized good office to reassure each side the other is 
doing what it has promised to do. 
IAN HURD: 
¶55 Thank you. 
¶56 I like very much that the High-Level Panel has two proposals on Council reform.  
Thinking about the Council membership debate, it seems not only politically necessary 
but also tactically smart to have the two, so that debate gets focused on the relative merits 
of the two principles on permanent membership, which narrows the argument compared 
to having just one principle.  This may contribute to a productive dynamic of debate. 
¶57 It strikes me as potentially dangerous, though, to invest a lot of political capital in 
reform at this point.  Despite the effo rts of the panelists, the Council-reform parts of the 
report dominated the media coverage; at least in the US, it was by far the most headlined 
part of the report, and that was a bit of a shame. 
¶58 What I would like to see on the whole issue is more discussion of why we want 
Council reform or what we are trying to accomplish with Council reform.  You have 
heard already a few suggestions about what the likely empirical effects are going to be of 
a larger Council, and it will be useful to sit down and look through the justifications for 
Council reform to see whether they make sense.  We should remember to ask: “Why do 
we want to change the membership of the Council?” and then investigate whether the 
proposed changes get us there or not.  Can we anticipate a better or a worse Council with 
respect to peace and security afterwards? 
LEE FEINSTEIN: 
¶59 First, let me just say before the moment passes that the conclusions, the final 
product that the High-Level Panel recommended, which is an excellent final product in 
my judgment, particularly the synopsis that describes the current situation we face, I 
think, as well as any document is extraordinary and against all expectations.  My nit-
picking aside, I think that the most important thing is that it was very important that 
something positive came out of the train wreck in Iraq. 
¶60 This is a very good start in that respect.  I think no one expected, including any 
members of the Panel, very late in the day, as good an outcome as this.  That is really 
attributed to Sir David and his colleagues on the Panel and the staff. 
¶61 With respect to two specific questions, let me talk first about the NPT system and 
also something that Sir David said.  What are the prospects of the survival of this two-tier 
system which discriminates against some and gives special rights to others? 
¶62 My judgment of this is that there are two issues involved.  One is the question of 
diplomacy and the other is the question of effectiveness. 
¶63 On diplomacy, it is important to make note of this concept of universality and what 
is good for one is good for all.  But, the truth is: US policy with respect to its biological 
weapons stockpiles or whether the United States ratifies or does not ratify the conference 
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test ban treaty is probably not going to have a big impact on Iran’s decisions about its 
nuclear program. 
¶64 It might provide some political cover to Iran to do the right thing, and in that sense 
it is diplomatically useful, but it is not going to affect the changes Iran feels it needs to 
make for its own security decisions of utmost importance. 
¶65 My idea on the NPT is that they are fine and the report is excellent, but the NPT is 
a trip wire but it is not effective at preventing states from going down the nuclear path.  It 
is only good at sounding the alarm once they have traveled very far down that road and 
even the additional protocol and all those things will only improve that on the margins.  
The opening proposition on the NPT is that it treats North Korea differently than 
Norway, which is not an acceptable way to do business in light of what we are 
confronting. 
¶66 I think that what the EU is doing led by Britain at Iran is an example of what needs 
to happen.  The NPT is a baseline and then you need additional measures early rather 
than waiting for some kind of intelligence finding and relying on it to be accurate or not.  
But, at the very first sign that they are moving in that direction, we need diplomatic 
direction.  And finally, democracies need to act outside of the UN where the machinery is 
deadlocked. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶67 Sir David, before we conclude, I would like to offer the diplomats an opportunity, 
if they wish, to add a concluding observation or comment. 
¶68 Ambassador Laurin of Canada. 
AMBASSADOR LAURIN: 
¶69 Thank you.  I would like to make two comments.  One is that as the panel noted, 
there are many things not right with the UN and the Panel has sought to provide us with 
solutions. 
¶70 But one thing that must never be forgotten is, with the exception of the Secretariat 
and the Secretary-General, the failure of the UN reflects the unwillingness of member 
states to take action to direct the Secretary-General or the institution to do something.  
The Secretary-General is a man who has 191 bosses, not all of whom agree; very often 
when they do not agree, they come to no conclusion at all, and so the institution appears 
paralyzed.  The institution reflects the will of member states.  I think we can never repeat 
that too often, and we must never forget that there is no institution outside of member 
states. 
¶71 The other point that I wanted to make is with respect to democracy.  There is no 
link between democracy and agreement on economic and social issues, none whatsoever, 
so I do not find it surprising that democracies cannot come together on a whole multitude 
of issues. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶72 Thank you.  Sir David, you have a concluding opportunity. 
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SIR DAVID HANNAY: 
¶73 One of the questions that remains to be answered is about the basic contract that the 
UN represents.  I think it is a slightly dangerous view.  It is sliding off a little bit into 
what I call the “Gulliver fantasy,” in which you believe you can use the United Nations to 
tie down the United States by thousands of tiny little strands so that the US will not be 
able to do the things that many of you would not want it to do.  I do not think that will 
work.  I think that the United Nations reform process which is set out here will only 
work, just as the United Nations’ “establishment crisis” in 1945 only worked, if it enlists 
the national self- interest of the United States of America.  It is as simple as that. 
¶74 The argument is about how to enlist that along with the national interests of the 
other 190 member states without seeing it as kind of a trade-off.  I do not think that is 
helpful. 
¶75 There was a question about the WHO and the ILO.  There is nothing I think of 
direct relevance.  We did not look into all the agencies, but there is not a direct relevance 
about the ILO.  The WHO most definitely has potential to be very important in the 
circumstances of an attack, a biological attack, which of course might be very similar to 
the symptoms of a natural epidemic like SARS or Avian flu, so we did identify the need 
for the WHO and the Security Council to get together and see how they would operate in 
such circumstances.  The Security Council might, for example, be needed to give 
mandatory force to certain recommendations of the World Health Organization in some 
circumstances and also to strengthen the public health defenses of countries that do not 
have enough resources to do that on their own because, as you probably know, the really 
dramatic thing that could happen is that the industrialized countries would be relatively 
well protected, but there would be an awful lot of countries that would have absolutely no 
defenses at all, which could be quite dramatic. 
¶76 The rapid reaction force.  Why did we turn our minds against it?  I am sorry to say 
it sounds awfully bureaucratic but the idea of a UN force just bristles with unanswered 
questions like: Under whose jurisdiction would it be?  Who would finance it?  Soldiers 
cost a lot of money and their equipment, too – where would they be stationed and how 
would they manage to intervene at the same time in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and about five other places all at once?  This was the view of the Secretary-General, too.  
It is not a practical proposition, but it is not that there is nothing there on the matter of 
rapid reaction. 
¶77 The EU has now identified an approach to this which they are working up: the 
battle group approach, under which they will hopefully have by 2007, ten or twelve battle 
groups ready to be put at the disposal of the United Nations for the initial phase of a 
peace operation before it is possible for blue-helmeted troops to deploy.  There is no 
reason at all why the EU should be the only provider of such a rapid reaction capability.  
Countries like India should be perfectly capable of producing a brigade or a battle group.  
I think this sort of approach is more likely to work than a standing rapid reaction force. 
¶78 The NPT Review Conference.  The two-tiered system will survive because this is 
not a conference to decide whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty continues.  It was 
extended sine die many years ago.  Therefore, it will continue, but will it be effective?  
That is the big question out there.  It really revolves at the moment around two countries, 
North Korea and Iran.  I think what one is going to have to realize somewhere down this 
track, and the Europeans in their dialogue with Iran are realizing it and the United States 
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in its dialogue with the five other members of the group on North Korea is recognizing it, 
is that if you want to stop these countries from going down the road they have already set 
off down – and there is little doubt that both of them have – you have to address their 
security concerns.  If you do not address their security concerns, there is no way you are 
going to stop them. 
¶79 Now, that is not easy, of course, particularly when you are dealing with regimes 
which are a little bit odd, to put it mildly.  But, the fact is that we would be very stupid if 
we did not recognize that they too have security concerns.  North Korea’s nuclear 
program is not actually driven by a mad design to rule the world.  It is being driven by the 
belief that it has a lot of unfriendly people around it.  It has chosen the wrong way to 
defend itself, in my view, but you have to address these concerns. 
¶80 I think it is time that the United States considered carefully how to enter the 
dialogue with Iran.  It is a very tricky, very sensitive issue, but it is the United States that 
Iran is worried about, not the three Europeans.  They do not think Britain, France, and 
Germany are going to invade them.  They do have their concerns from time to time about 
some things that are said by some members of the Administration and some outside the 
Administration, and I think that will have to be addressed. 
¶81 Emerging countries that are coming to be big powers.  Well, the Panel Report did 
talk about that in the context of the G8, which we considered to be a grouping which is 
probably past its sell-by date. 
¶82 We do think a large number of the issues that have to be faced on the environment, 
on non-proliferation, on poverty, and on world trade are going to have to bring in China, 
India, Brazil, and Africa – these new big players.  So we are, quite frankly, closet 
supporters of the Canadian Prime Minister’s L20 idea.  We actually put into the report the 
desirability of moving towards this. 
¶83 Whether this should be a substitute for the G8 or a kind of add-on to it, that is the 
kind of diplomatic nicety that can be dealt with.  But, I do think you need to bring China, 
India, Brazil, and South Africa into the discussion on how to get an environmental regime 
that will bring the big developing countries within its scope, and so on. 
¶84 Is there a shift of power away from the member states to the Secretariat?  No, not 
really.  I think anybody who works in an international organization quickly comes to the 
conclusion that if they set it up in the first place to achieve certain objectives, they do 
actually need somebody to do the work and to do it well.  It cannot be done by 
committees composed of 191 members so you do need an effective Secretariat. 
¶85 It is what we in Europe discovered long ago in relation to the powers we gave to 
the Commission which, of course, are far more wide-ranging than those suggested for the 
UN.  We have suggested no change in the powers of the Secretary-General and the 
Secretariat, just a change in his ability to deliver what the member states collectively 
want him to do.  Otherwise, you are what an American friend of mine described as “you 
are trying to push it with a piece of damn spaghetti” – not a good idea. 
¶86 Finally, will the President get us a settlement in the Middle East in four years?  
Well, nobody can answer tha t question but it sure will be more likely if he tries. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶87 Thank you very much, Lord Hannay, and each of our panelists on this and on the 
previous two panels. 
